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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT  
   
 
No. 10-3623  
   
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
                
v. 
 
AHMED WALKER, 
a/k/a Amelios, 
a/k/a Ammo 
 
Ahmed Walker, 
Appellant. 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (No. 1-00-cr-00300-003) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia Rambo 
      
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1  
on July 15, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 29, 2011) 
   
 
O P I N I O N 
    
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 Ahmed Walker appeals from the District Court’s partial denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 
2 
 
2255 petition; he also appeals the new sentence imposed after the partial grant of his 
petition.  The District Court certified for appeal two ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims and one sentencing issue.1
 On May 16, 2001, a grand jury issued a superseding indictment charging Walker 
and two co-defendants with seven counts arising from their participation in a shootout at 
the Lebanon Village Apartments with a rival drug gang from New York.
  However, Walker also claims on this appeal that his 
new sentence is unreasonable.  This issue was not covered by the certificate of 
appealability.  Nevertheless, we will permit the review of the newly imposed sentence 
because otherwise Wilson would have no opportunity to have it reviewed.  See United 
States v. Hadden, 475 F.3d 652, 664 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that, on appeal of a § 2255 
order, to the extent that a claim is made that the newly imposed sentence is not in 
conformity with the Constitution or Sentencing Guidelines, then the prisoner “is 
appealing a new criminal sentence and therefore need not obtain a COA under §§ 3742(a) 
and 1291.”); United States v. Futch, 518 F.3d 887, 894 (11th Cir. 2008).  For the reasons 
discussed below, we will affirm. 
2
                                                 
1 In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Abbott v. United States, __ U.S. __, 
131 S. Ct. 18 (2010), Walker withdrew his application for certificate of appealability on 
the sentencing issue.  (Appellant Br. at 16 n.10.)  We therefore do not have jurisdiction to 
consider this issue.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3).   
  Walker 
 
2 Walker was charged with six counts:  (1) conspiracy to possess, use, carry, 
brandish, and discharge firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c) and (o);  (2) possessing, brandishing and discharging a firearm in 
furtherance of drug trafficking on March 13, 2000, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c);  (3) 
possession of firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking on July 12, 2000, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c);  (4) possessing, brandishing and discharging a firearm in furtherance 
of drug trafficking between July 18, 2000, and July 21, 2000, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
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pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial. 
  In the midst of trial, Walker’s co-defendants entered into guilty pleas with the 
government.  After the guilty pleas were entered with the trial court, Walker’s trial 
counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that no curative instruction would adequately 
address why Walker remained in the courtroom and that the testimony of two witnesses 
would not have been admitted had Walker been the only defendant.  The trial court 
denied the motion but gave the jury a curative instruction.  
 During the trial, Dennis Rittle also twice stated in his testimony that Walker had 
been shot, despite the District Court’s pre-trial ruling that any reference to an unrelated 
shooting in which Walker had been injured was inadmissible.  Rittle’s statements were 
brief and addressed the injury Walker sustained during the July 21, 2000, shooting.  The 
government did not improperly elicit this testimony and, in response, sought to avoid 
drawing further attention to the testimony by directing Rittle to other subjects.  Walker’s 
trial counsel moved for a mistrial on the grounds that Rittle’s two references to Walker’s 
shooting injuries were inappropriate.  The trial court denied Walker’s motion.  Walker’s 
counsel did not seek a curative instruction. 
The jury found Walker guilty on all counts.  The District Court sentenced Walker 
to 681 months’ imprisonment.  On appeal, we vacated his sentence in part and remanded 
for resentencing.  See United States v. Walker, 136 Fed. Appx. 524, 526 (3d Cir. 2005).  
                                                                                                                                                             
924(c);  (5) criminal conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 
grams or more of crack cocaine, cocaine hydrochloride and heroin, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §846; and (6) distribution and possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or 
more of crack cocaine, cocaine hydrochloride, heroin, and marijuana, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a).  (Dkt. 48.)    
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On remand, the District Court reduced Walker’s sentence to 622 months.  In a subsequent 
appeal, we affirmed Walker’s second sentence.  See United States v. Walker, 251 Fed. 
Appx. 735 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied Walker v. United States, 557 U.S. 1137 (2007).  
 Walker then filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging 
fourteen claims of error including ineffective assistance by trial and appellate counsel.  
The court held an evidentiary hearing on April 20, 2010, and permitted Walker to file a 
supplemental post-hearing brief.  
 During the evidentiary hearing, Walker’s trial counsel testified that he had moved 
for a mistrial – rather than requesting a curative instruction – after the co-defendants 
pleaded guilty and were excused from the trial because he “basically[] didn’t think the 
curative instruction was adequate – [he] didn’t think the curative instruction would 
suffice.”  With respect to Rittle’s statements about Walker’s gunshot wound, although he 
“[had] no independent recollection of what [he] was thinking at that time” because the 
trial occurred eight years before, counsel stated that he did not seek a curative instruction 
concerning those statements because he “didn’t want to cause it anymore – give anymore 
importance to it or bring it up again.”   
The court granted in part and denied in part Walker’s habeas petition, vacated his 
conviction as to Count 4, and resentenced him to 289 months imprisonment.3
                                                 
3 The District Court granted Walker’s motion as to his claim that the trial court 
erred when it imposed two consecutive sentences for possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of drug trafficking.  Relying on United States v. Diaz, 592 F.3d 467, 475 (3d 
Cir. 2010),  the District Court held that because there was no way of knowing which 
predicate offense was associated with which § 924(c) charge, it could not “simply assume 
that the § 924(c) charges were tied to the separate predicate offenses.” 
  With 
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respect to the curative instruction related to the co-defendants’ absence, the court noted 
that “it certainly would have been preferable for the court to have explicitly stated that 
the absence of other defendants should not be held against Walker, rather than simply 
stating that the reasons for their absence was not a matter for the jury’s concern,” but 
ultimately concluded that the district court’s instruction was not so “woefully inadequate” 
as to call the proceedings into question.  As for the shooting incident, the court found that 
trial counsel’s decision not to request a curative instruction was “the sort of strategic 
decision made by trial counsel that falls well within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance.” 
We have appellate jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 
2255(d).  We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and 
apply a clearly erroneous standard to the District Court’s factual findings in a habeas 
proceeding.  United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 245, 258 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 To succeed on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Walker must 
demonstrate (1) that trial counsel’s performance was unconstitutionally deficient and that 
(2) such performance prejudiced Walker’s defense.  Boyd v. Waymart, 579 F.3d 330, 350 
(3d Cir. 2009) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984)).  We agree 
with the District Court’s determinations on both claims of ineffective assistance.   
 As for his sentence, Walker first contends that it was unreasonable because it 
should have been reduced by six months for time served on a related state offense.  We 
have determined, however, after our review of the record that the six months 
imprisonment in question was served on an unrelated aggravated assault offense.  Thus, 
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the District Court did not err in failing to credit Walker for that period.  As to the claim 
that the sentence was unreasonable, our review also convinces us that, in imposing the 
below-the-guidelines sentence, the District court listened carefully to Walker and his 
counsel and considered their contentions and the applicable § 3553 factors.  See United 
States v. Cooper, 562 F.3d 558, 569 (3d Cir. 2009).  We conclude that the greatly reduced 
sentence was reasonable and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing it.  
 We will therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
